When nothing is seen, what else could be directly realized? This is precisely the sākṣātkāra, the mark of the liberated in life.

sākṣātkāra —direct realization, unmediated vision— is here defined negatively: not as the acquisition of something new, but as the cessation of all seeing of objects. This definition by privation is characteristic of advaita: the positive state that is attained cannot be described in terms of what has ceased, because every term belongs to the domain of what has ceased.

“Jīvanmuktasya lakṣaṇam” —the mark of one liberated while alive— places this experience on the plane of what is verifiable. It is not a post-mortem promise nor a state reserved for renunciants in caves. It is the description of how reality is experienced when the veil of superimposition (adhyāsa) has been dispelled. The Jīvanmuktiviveka dedicates entire chapters to distinguishing this from the mere absence of thought: a sleeping person has no thoughts but is not a jīvanmukta; a mad person may lack coherent thoughts but is not a jīvanmukta. The difference is the direct knowledge (sākṣātkāra) of one’s own nature.

The Aṣṭāvakra Gītā (II.21) expresses this with maximum economy: “If you desire freedom, abandon the things of the world from the mind. If you desire to enjoy them, abandon them with the body.” The jīvanmukta does not need to abandon anything with the body because they have already seen that there is nothing to possess or lose. Their freedom is not a conquest but a recognition —they do not acquire what they did not have, but rather cease losing what they never lost.

Sākṣātkāra —direct realization, unmediated vision— is here defined negatively: not as the acquisition of something new, but as the cessation of all seeing of objects. This definition by privation is characteristic of advaita: the positive state that is attained cannot be described in terms of what has ceased, because every term belongs to the domain of what has ceased.

“Jīvanmuktasya lakṣaṇam” —the mark of one liberated while alive— places this experience on the plane of what is verifiable. It is not a post-mortem promise nor a state reserved for renunciants in caves. It is the description of how reality is experienced when the veil of superimposition (adhyāsa) has been dispelled. The Jīvanmuktiviveka dedicates entire chapters to distinguishing this from the mere absence of thought: a sleeping person has no thoughts but is not a jīvanmukta; a mad person may lack coherent thoughts but is not a jīvanmukta. The difference is the direct knowledge (sākṣātkāra) of one’s own nature.

The Aṣṭāvakra Gītā (II.21) expresses this with maximum economy: “If you desire freedom, abandon the things of the world from the mind. If you desire to enjoy them, abandon them with the body.” The jīvanmukta does not need to abandon anything with the body because they have already seen that there is nothing to possess or lose. Their freedom is not a conquest but a recognition —they do not acquire what they did not have, but cease losing what they never lost.