Śivasaṃhitā 1.11

The verse presents radical empiricism: only what falls within the domain of direct sensory perception (pratyakṣaviṣaya) can be said to exist. Heaven, hell, liberation, the soul — anything beyond sensory reach is simply nowhere. The implicit rhetorical question about heaven and hell captures the materialist challenge to religious metaphysics with pointed brevity.

Pratyakṣa is the first and most foundational of the pramāṇas (valid means of knowledge) across nearly all Indian philosophical systems: prati (before, in front of) + akṣa (eye, sense organ). It denotes knowledge arising from direct sensory contact. Viṣaya means object, field, domain. The position described here elevates pratyakṣa to the sole criterion of reality, dismissing inference (anumāna) and scriptural testimony (śabda) as inadmissible.

The school most directly evoked is Cārvāka or Lokāyata, ancient Indian materialism, which genuinely maintained that sensory perception alone constitutes valid evidence. By including this view in his philosophical survey, the author of the Śivasaṃhitā demonstrates familiarity with the full spectrum of Indian thought, setting up a systematic demonstration that each partial position ultimately fails to account for the totality of experience.